Ross ROSS = Recommend OSS · open-source software intelligence for agents

nickboucher/trojan-source resource

Trojan Source: Invisible Vulnerabilities observed · 2026-08-28

github.com/nickboucher/trojan-source · homepage · SCSS · MIT (permissive) observed · 2026-08-28

Health v2 · maintenance only

32/100

  • Activity 0
  • Release rhythm 35
  • Longevity 100

Flags: no_releases

How is this computed?

round(0.45*activity + 0.35*rhythm + 0.20*longevity); archived -> min(score, 10) — computed 2026-09-03. Adoption (stars, forks) is never an input.

  • gap_med: n/a
  • age_days: 1890
  • days_rel: n/a
  • days_push: 1225
  • n_releases_24m: 0

Full methodology

Adoption not part of the score

1285 stars · 266 forks observed · 2026-08-28

What it is AI-extracted, prompt v1, taxonomy v1, 2026-08-30, confidence not recorded

The reference repository for the Trojan Source attack (CVE-2021-42574), which uses Unicode bidirectional control characters to make source code visually display logic different from what the compiler actually executes. It bundles proofs-of-concept across a dozen languages (C, C++, Java, Rust, Go, Python, Solidity, and more), compiler-level defense guidance, and the companion research paper and website.

Use cases

  • learn how unicode bidi control characters can hide vulnerabilities in source code
  • test whether a compiler or interpreter is vulnerable to trojan source encoding attacks
  • understand supply chain attacks that deceive human code reviewers
  • find proofs of concept for CVE-2021-42574 in specific languages
  • study mitigations for invisible source code vulnerabilities in editors, repos, and build pipelines
  • research academic work on adversarial source code encoding

When to choose

  • You are studying or teaching how Trojan Source / bidi reordering attacks on source code work
  • You want per-language proofs of concept to verify whether toolchains, editors, or CI pipelines render and compile such code safely
  • You are researching supply-chain attack techniques or designing compiler-level and code-review defenses

When to avoid

  • You need a production-ready scanner that continuously detects malicious Unicode in your repositories rather than research artifacts
  • You want an actively maintained security tool with new features instead of a completed research publication
  • You need turnkey mitigation tooling for a specific language ecosystem out of the box

Facets

learning-resource · maturity stable

security security programming-languages developer-tools cross-platform c cpp python rust go trojan-source unicode bidi-characters supply-chain-security vulnerability-research proof-of-concept cve-2021-42574 code-review compiler-security academic-research homoglyph-attacks nodejs

2 sources

Member repositories

RepositoryRoleHealth v2
nickboucher/trojan-sourcemain32

For agents

markdown · JSON · MCP: product_card(name="nickboucher/trojan-source")

Data as of 2026-08-30T08:39:29.467469+00:00 · Report a problem