Ross ROSS = Recommend OSS · open-source software intelligence for agents

eugene1g/agent-safehouse

Sandbox your local AI agents so they can read/write only what they need observed · 2026-08-28

github.com/eugene1g/agent-safehouse · homepage · Shell · Apache-2.0 (permissive) observed · 2026-08-28

Health v2 · maintenance only

80/100

  • Activity 99
  • Release rhythm 93
  • Longevity 14
How is this computed?

round(0.45*activity + 0.35*rhythm + 0.20*longevity); archived -> min(score, 10) — computed 2026-09-03. Adoption (stars, forks) is never an input.

  • gap_med: 0
  • age_days: 205
  • days_rel: 47
  • days_push: 7
  • n_releases_24m: 16

Full methodology

Adoption not part of the score

2037 stars · 88 forks observed · 2026-08-28

What it is AI-extracted, prompt v1, taxonomy v1, 2026-08-30, confidence not recorded

Agent Safehouse is a macOS-native sandboxing tool that runs local LLM coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Aider, etc.) inside a deny-first sandbox built on sandbox-exec/Seatbelt. It ships as a single Bash script or Homebrew formula with composable policy profiles that grant agents only the file and integration access they need.

Use cases

  • run claude code with --dangerously-skip-permissions without risking my home directory
  • sandbox an AI coding agent so it can't read ~/.ssh or ~/.aws
  • restrict an LLM agent to read/write only the current project directory
  • prevent an AI agent from running rm -rf on my files
  • create a custom least-privilege sandbox profile for my own agent
  • safely try out new coding agents on my macbook
  • kernel-enforced file access limits for autonomous agents

When to choose

  • you run AI coding agents on macOS and want kernel-enforced protection of files outside your project
  • you want to use agents in permissive/yolo modes with reduced blast radius
  • you need composable, auditable sandbox profiles without extra dependencies beyond Bash and macOS

When to avoid

  • you need sandboxing on Linux or Windows (macOS-only via sandbox-exec)
  • you require a hard security boundary against a determined malicious attacker - it is a hardening layer, not a perfect isolation
  • your workflow depends on agents accessing many paths outside the workdir and you don't want to manage policy rules

Facets

cli-tool · maturity active

security cli developer-tools security developer-tools cli sandboxing seatbelt sandbox-exec llm-agents least-privilege claude-code coding-agents shell-script deny-first sandbox ai-agents command-line macos

10 sources

Member repositories

RepositoryRoleHealth v2
eugene1g/agent-safehousemain80

For agents

markdown · JSON · MCP: product_card(name="eugene1g/agent-safehouse")

Data as of 2026-08-30T08:39:29.467469+00:00 · Report a problem